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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—NLRB Jurisdiction Over Law Firms—Bodle, Fogel,
Julber, Reinhardt & Roth8child. 1—The International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
(union or petitioner) sought to represent certain employees of Bodle,
Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild (Bodle or employer), a
California law firm. 2 Bodle resisted these efforts and the union filed
a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The
employer filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its operations
were essentially local in nature and that any impact they might have
on interstate commerce was remote, and therefore insufficient to
warrant the assertion of the Board's jurisdiction. 3 The Board agreed
with the employee and dismissed the petition. 5 However, the Board
did not limit the scope of its decision to the facts presented. It
deemed it appropriate to decide "whether we ought to decline juris-
diction over law firms generally or whether we ought to attempt to
establish jurisdictional standards and to assert jurisdiction over
certain classes of law firms."6
 The Board HELD: it would decline to
assert jurisdiction over law firms as a class.'
This casenote will examine the Board's decision in Bodle,
Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild (Bodle) regarding jurisdic-
tion over law firms. Two questions will be posed. First, did the facts
presented in Bodle provide an appropriate occasion for the Board to
decline to assert jurisdiction over law firms as a class? Second, does
the decision of the Board, and the reasoning employed in reaching
it, withstand close analysis? It will be submitted that both of these
questions must be answered in the negative. Before posing these
questions, however, a brief overview of the history and scope of
NLRB jurisdiction is in order.
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF NLRB JURISDICTION
Since first enacted in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act) 8 has empowered the Board9 "to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . [as defined by
1 206 N.L,R.B. No. 60, 84 L. R.R.M. 1321 (1973). This decision, by Chairman Miller
and Members Jenkins and Kennedy, was subject to a strong dissent by members Fanning and
Penello. 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323.




 Id. at 1323.
o Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1323.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
9 The National Labor Relations Board was created by 3(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
153(a) (1970).
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the Act")] affecting commerce."" In section 1 of the Act Congress
declared that the denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize, and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining, had led to strikes and unrest which had the
effect of obstructing interstate commerce. 12 The jurisdiction of the
Board was therefore extended to "labor disputes,"" which include
representation questions and unfair labor practices "affecting" inter-
state commerce."
In enacting the NLRA "Congress intended to . . . vest in the
Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible
under the Commerce Clause." 15 The Board, however, is not com-
pelled to exercise this jurisdiction. Section 10(a) of the Act 16 empow-
ered but did not require the Board to prevent all unfair labor
practices in all industries." The Board may properly decline to
assert jurisdiction over an employer in a particular industry if, in its
discretion, it considers that "the policies of the Act would not be
effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction." 18 The reason for the
existence of such discretion is that the Board is not a court whose
jurisdiction must be exercised, but rather an administrative agency
whose function it is to protect public rights in a manner that will
effectuate the policies of the Act. 19 As the Supreme Court noted in
Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 2° "Congress therefore left it to
the Board to ascertain whether proscribed practices would in par-
ticular situations adversely affect commerce . . . ?)21
The Board has never exercised the full measure of its
jurisdiction. 22 For the first fifteen years of its existence, the Board
decided on a case-by-case basis whether or not to assert jurisdiction
over the employer. 23 Thereafter, the Board utilized varying sets of
jurisdictional standards to aid it in making such determinations. In
1950 the Board, in Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 24 concluded that
"experience warrants the establishment and announcement of cer-
1 ° "Unfair labor practices" are defined in § 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
11 Section 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
12 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
U "Labor dispute" is defined in § 2(9) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1970). In the
absence of a "labor dispute" the Board cannot act. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992, 56 L.R.R.M. 2244 (4th Cir. 1964).
14 ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, The Developing Labor Law 761 (C. Morris ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as The Developing Labor Law].
15 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963). See also Polish Nat'l
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
16 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
11 The Developing Labor Law, supra note 14, at 762.
le NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
19 Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 13 (1957).
20 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
21 Id. at 648.
22 Guss, 353 U.S. at 3.
" Id.
24 91 N.L.R,B. 635, 26 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1950).
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tain standards" to govern the assertion of jurisdiction over the
employer. 25
 Shortly thereafter, minimum standards for assertion of
jurisdiction26
 were published in terms of yearly dollar amounts of
outflow and inflow between the employer's operation and the stream
of interstate commerce. 27
 In 1954 the Board narrowed the scope of
its discretionary jurisdiction by increasing the minimum dollar
amounts necessary to invoke its jurisdiction, 28 although members of
the Board were sharply divided as to the propriety of so narrowing
the Board's jurisdiction. 29
In 1957 the Supreme Court, in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Board," held that section 10(a) of the Act foreclosed state juris-
diction over labor disputes where the Board possessed the authority
to assert jurisdiction, but in its discretion had declined to exercise its
statutory authority. 3 ' The Court recognized that this would create
"a vast no-man's-land subject to regulation by no agency or court" 32
but noted that "the National Labor Relations Board can greatly
reduce the area of the no-man's-land by reasserting its jurisdiction.
. . "33
 In response to the Guss decision the Board decreased its
minimum monetary jurisdictional standards in Siemons Mailing
Service. 34 In Siemons the Board concluded:
that it will best effectuate the policies of the Act if jurisdic-
tion is asserted over all nonretail enterprises which have an
outflow or inflow across State lines of at least $50,000,
whether such outflow or inflow be regarded as direct or
indirect. 35
The Board defined outflow and inflow to include the flow of services
as well as goods. 36
In addition to setting minimum jurisdictional standards, the
Board has also declined, as a matter of policy, to assert jurisdiction
over certain classes of employers. 37 However, in 1957 in Office
25
 Id. at 636, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1543.
26
 Board Press Release of October 5, 1950, 26 L.R.R.M. 50-51 (1950).
27
 Guss, 353 U.S. at 3-4.
28
 Board Press Release of July 15, 1954, 34 L.R.R.M. 75-78 (1954).
29
 Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493, 498-500, 506-08, 35 L.R.R.M. 1020, 1023,
1026-27 (1954). Member Murdock, for instance, feared that the new standards would drasti-
cally "slash" the scope of the Board's jurisdiction. Id. at 506-08, 35 L.R.R.M. at 1026-27.
30 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
" Id. at 9.
32




 122 N.L.RB, 81, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1958).
35
 Id. at 85, 43 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
36 Id.
37
 Office Employees, 113 N.L.R.B. 987, 36 L.R.R.M. 1408 (1955) (issue of whether to
assert jurisdiction over labor unions functioning as employers of employees); Virgin Isles
Hotel, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 558, 35 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1954) (issue of whether to assert jurisdic-
tion over an employer operating a hotel).
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Employees 38
 and in 1958 in Hotel Employees, 39
 the Supreme Court
held that the Board could not, as a matter of policy, refuse to assert
jurisdiction over entire classes of employers. 40 The Court reasoned
that while it was proper for the Board to decline to assert jurisdic-
tion in a particular case, it was beyond the power of the Board to
exclude all employers in a given field from the coverage of the Act. 41
As a result of the Court's decision in Hotel Employees, the Board, in
Floridian Hotel of Tampa, Inc.," asserted jurisdiction over a
specific hotel and adopted minimum jurisdictional standards appli-
cable to hotel and motel enterprises generally.
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Guss, Office Employees
and Hotel Employees, Congress passed the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 43 which added section 14(c)44 to
the National Labor Relations Act. In section 14(c)(1) Congress
granted the Board discretion to decline to assert jurisdiction over an
entire class of employers, subject to the qualification that it could
not do so with respect to any labor dispute over which it would have
asserted jurisdiction under the standards prevailing on August 1,
1959. Congress thereby approved the Board's newly adopted
minimum jurisdictional standards, but proscribed future increases
of such minimums. 43
 Section 14(c)(2) also eliminated the
no-man's-land by granting state courts and agencies jurisdiction
over disputes over which the Board declines to exercise its statutory
jurisdiction . 46
Since the passage of section 14(c) the Board has exercised its
discretion to decline to assert jurisdiction over entire classes of
employers over which it had not been asserting jurisdiction as of
August 1, 1959. 47
 The Board has also asserted jurisdiction over
38
 Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
39
 Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
48 353 U.S. at 318-20; 358 U.S. at 99.
41
 353 U.S. at 318-20.
47
 124 N.L.R.B. 261, 44 L.R.R M. 1345 (1959).
43
 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970). Section 14(c) provides:
(1)The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall
not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
(2)Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or
the courts of any State or Territory . . . from assuming and asserting jurisdiction
over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
43
 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
" 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970).
47
 E.g., Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 388, 45 L.R.R.M. 1106
(1959) (race track); Seattle Real Estate Bd., 130 N.L.R.B 608, 47 L.R.R.M. 1348
(1961) (real estate board).
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classes of employers over which it had previously declined to assert
jurisdiction.48 Recently, the Board reiterated its discretionary au-
thority not to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent authorized
by the Act, but to limit its exercise to enterprises whose operations
have a pronounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce. 49
II. NLRB JURISDICTION OVER LAW FIRMS
In over thirty-five years of existence the Board has never as-
serted jurisdiction over a law firm." In Evans & Kuntz, Ltd., 5 ' the
only other case in this area, the. Board declined to assert jurisdiction
over a small, six-attorney law firm which practiced almost solely
within the state of Arizona. 52 The complaint in Evans alleged that
the employer engaged in unfair labor practices by discharging three
secretaries for engaging in concerted activities. The Board found
that the law firm was engaged in operations affecting interstate
commerce within the meaning of section 2(6) and (7) of the Act."
Notwithstanding this finding, it also found, pursuant to section
14(c)(1) of the Act, that it was empowered to decline to assert
jurisdiction in Evans since the effect of the labor dispute on inter-
state commerce was not sufficiently substantial." However, the
Board in Evans limited its decision "solely to the facts of the instant
case and not to law firms as a class."55 On the other hand, in Bodle,
the Board did not limit itself to the facts presented, but rather
announced that it would decline to assert jurisdiction over law firms
as a class of employers.
At the time the case was brought before the Board, the em-
ployer was a twelve-member law firm composed of five partners and
seven associates and engaged in the practice of law in California. 56
With its principal office in Los Angeles, the firm also maintained a
subsidiary office in Wilmington, California, to accommodate its
maritime clients. Engaged primarily in the practice of labor law, the
employer represented various local, national and international labor
unions." In connection with its labor relations law practice, the
employer engaged in proceedings under numerous acts of
Congress, 58 and appeared before a number of federal regulatory
48 E.g., American Guild of Variety Artists, 155 N.L.R.B. 1020, 60 L.R.R.M.
1403 (1965) (artist guild),
49 Evans & Kuntz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1218, 79 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1972).
5° Id.
S
' 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 79 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1972).
52 Id. at 1216, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1182.
55 29 U.S.C. 41§ 152(6), (7) (1970).
54 194 N.L.R.B, at 1216, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1182.
55 Id.
56 Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. No, 60, 84
L.R.R.M. 1321 (1973).
57 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323 (dissenting opinion).
5R Bodle engaged in proceedings under the Jones Act, the Federal Employers
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agencies59 in addition to state and federal courts. Each of the twelve
attorneys employed by the firm made a number of business trips
each year outside of California. 6°
A. The Propriety of the Board's Declination of Jurisdiction
on the Facts of Bodle
The existence of the statutory jurisdiction of the Board was not
disputed in Bodle. 6 I The employer was engaged in operations affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of sections 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. 62
 The majority itself found that "the commerce data presented
would clearly be enough to satisfy the 'affecting commerce' test" 63 as
it is customarily liberally construed. Nor did the firm fail to meet the
Siemons $50,000 outflow-inflow standard." It was stipulated that
the firm annually received gross revenues of $500,000, of which
more than $50,000 was for legal services furnished to various
clients, each of whom met the Board's Siemons standards, and that
the firm represented a defense contractor in Vietnam from which it
received in excess of $50,000 annually." However, notwithstanding
Bodle's involvement with interstate commerce, the Board is em-
powered by section 14(c) of the Act to decline to assert jurisdiction
over entire classes of employers. In Bodle the Board exercised this
power.
A strong argument can be made that the Bodle case was not the
appropriate occasion for the Board to decide whether or not to
exercise jurisdiction over law firms as a class. First, even though
Bodle engaged in a larger volume of legal business than did Evans
& Kuntz, 66 the Bodle law firm was still only of moderate size. There
are numerous large firms across the country with fifty or more
attorneys—with many firms exceeding 100 attorneys. Second, de-
spite the impressive litany of interstate dealings, the greater part of
Bodle's practice was carried on within the state of California. 67 The
practice of the Evans firm was even more localized in nature."
There are numerous firms whose practice is predominantly or exclu-
sively interstate in character. These larger firms, with enormous
Liability Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the equal employment titles of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 1324 (dissenting opinion).
59 Bodle had appeared before the NLRB, Department of Labor, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, United States Coast Guard, Federal Aviation
Agency and the Systems Board of Adjustment. Id.
6° Id.
61 Id. at 1321.
62 Id. Section 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA are codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6),. (7)
(1970).








interstate practices, have a far greater potential impact upon com-
merce. Yet, Bodle and Evans represent the only two cases in which
the Board has been confronted with the question of whether or not
to assert jurisdiction over law firms as a class. Arguably the Board
should have withheld its decision to refuse to assert jurisdiction over
law firms as a class until presented with a labor dispute involving a
large firm with a large interstate practice. In this way, the Board
would have been better able to judge the impact of law firms as a
class on commerce. Thus, Bodle appears to have been premature.
In addition to the fact that the Board's decision appears to have
been premature, there was a peculiar factor present in Bodle which
mitigated against extending the decision of the Board to law firms
generally in the instant case. The facts in Bodle were somewhat
unique in that the union which sought to represent Bodle's em-
ployees appeared to be in direct competition with certain of the
firm's union clients, thus producing a conflict of interest. As will be
developed herein, the Board relied upon this factor in reaching its
decision concerning law firms as a class. Yet, such a conflict of
interest would be present in only a small percentage of cases involv-
ing law firms. Given the uniqueness of this factor, perhaps it would
have been more advisable for the Board to confine its decision to the
facts of the case, as it did in Evans.
Nevertheless, pursuant to its discretionary authority under sec-
tion 14(c)(1) of the Act, the Board declined to exercise its jurisdic-
tion. In so doing, the Board reasoned that, in view of what it
considered to be the insubstantial impact of law firms on interstate
commerce, and the policy and administrative problems that would
be attendant on the regulation of law firms, the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over law firms would not serve to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
B. Analysis of the Reasoning Employed by the Board
in Bodle
In Bodle the Board found that the policies of the NLRA would
not be effectuated by the assertion of jurisdiction over law firms."
Before considering the specific contentions of the Board, two points
should be noted. First, it appears to have been the legislative intent
of Congress that the coverage of the Act be extended to attorneys.
Section 2(12) of the Act specifically defines "professional em-
ployee[s]" covered by the Act. 7° This definition encompasses
legal, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior
professional assistants. 7 ' The Board failed to take note of this
congressional judgment in reaching its decision. Second, in the - past
the Board has not hesitated to certify labor organizations as the
69 Id. at 1323.
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
71
 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947).
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bargaining representatives of professional employees, 72 and this
practice has been inferentially endorsed by the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, which contemplated the establishment of
separate units of professional employees. 73
In reaching its decision in Bodle, the Board reasoned (1) that
the nature of the work of the legal profession renders minimal the
degree of impact upon interstate commerce of potential labor dis-
putes between law firms and their employees, and (2) that there are
serious policy and administrative problems suggesting the undesir-
ability and unfeasibility of any attempt to assert jurisdiction over
lawyers and law firms. 74 With regard to the first reason set forth by
the Board, the dissenting members noted that the mere recital of
facts concerning Bodle, "including the nature of the clients served,
the industries involved, and the amount of travel outside the State
of California, immediately casts doubt on the conclusion there is
only a minimal impact on commerce."75 However, the application
of the Act is not determined by the magnitude of the business76 nor
the comparative amount of interstate sales." In deciding whether or
not to assert jurisdiction over a particular class of employers, the
test of the Board's jurisdiction is "whether the stoppage of business
by reason of labor strife would tend substantially to affect
commerce." 78 The Board must determine whether there exists be-
tween employer and employee such a relationship to commerce that
an unfair labor practice would lead, or tend to lead, to a labor
dispute between the employer and the employees obstructing the
free flow of commerce. 79 The test is one of degree. 8 °
The Board should assert jurisdiction where the unfair labor
practice involved is found to have such a close and substantial
relationship to the free flow of interstate commerce that the practice
tends to obstruct that commerce. 81 In making this determination the
Board must not confine its judgment to the quantitative effect of the
activities before it. 82
 Appropriate for judgment "is the fact that the
immediate situation is representative of many others throughout the
72
 E.g., Wagner Elec. Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 1104, 18 L.R.R.M, 1044 (1946) (professional
accountants and engineers); Aluminum Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 318, 16 L.R.R.M. 259 (1945)
(professional chemists and engineers).
73
 Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1135, 21 L,R.R.M. 1107, 1109
(1948).
74 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323.
75 Id. at 1324 (dissenting opinion).
76 J.L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 977, 980, 14 L.R.R.M. 759, 761 (8th Cir.
1944).
77 Id.
TR Service Stores Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1162-63, 16 L.R.R.M. 278 (1945).
79 Brandeis, 142 F.2d at 980, 14 L.R.R.M. at 761.
SO Id.
81 Id.
82 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963).
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country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well
become far-reaching in its harm to commerce." 83
Under this test, the Board concluded that the probability that
labor strife in Bodle or any other law firm would result in a disrup-
tion of interstate commerce is not sufficient to warrant the assertion
of jurisdiction over law firms." The Board reasoned that it is the
law firm's client "who is the moving force in commerce" 85 and that
the firm itself is not "engaged in the production, distribution, or sale
of goods in commerce." 86
 However, it has long been settled that an
employer may be subject to the Board's jurisdiction although not
himself engaged in commerce. 87
 The jurisdictional standards of the
Board, as the dissent noted, have always encompassed enterprises
furnishing-services to other enterprises engaged directly in interstate
commerce," even when the services furnished are intangible. 89
Nevertheless, the majority of the Board reasoned that the ser-
vices furnished by law firms have "little direct or immediate impact"
on the commerce in which its clients are engaged. 9° A realistic
assessment of the effect that the operation of law firms have on
commerce, however, compels the opposite conclusion. In appraising
whether an industry has an impact on commerce, the Board must
consider the totality of operations of all employers (large and small)
in the class." In 1967 there were over 324,000 attorneys in the
United States, and almost 70,000 law firms with over 200,000
employees. 92
 Thousands of sedretaries, typists and receptionists are
included in the latter figure. 93
 In addition, many law firms are
developing paralegal staffs at the present time. Law firms reported
receipts of $6.4 billion in 1967. 94 The operation of a modern law
firm encompasses the rendering of many services well beyond the
traditional functions of preparing and bringing cases to trial. 95
 Law
firms frequently assist large corporations, labor unions and other
institutions in their interstate commerce activity. The legal profes-
83 Id.





 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604 (1939).
" See, e.g., Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R,H. 81, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (1958) (mailing
service); Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 26 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1950) (logging and
processing lumber).
89
 See, e.g., Truman Schlup, Consulting Engineer, 145 N.L.R.B. 768, 55 L.R.R.M.
1044 (1963) (engineering services); Hazelton Laboratories, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1609, 50
L.R.R.M. 1063 (1962) (research services).
96 Bodle, 84 L. R. R. M, at 1322.
91
 Fainblatt, 306 U.S. at 607-08.
92
 84 L.R.R.M. at 1324 n.4.
93
 Evans & Kuntz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B, 1216, 1218, 79 L.R.R.M, 1181 (1972).
94
 See 84 L.R.R.M. at 1324 n.4.
95
 Id. at 1322.
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sion plays a vital role in all stages of interstate commerce including
the obtaining of licenses needed for governmental approval of rates
and routes, the issuance of stocks and bonds, real estate transac-
tions, purchase and sale contracts for materials and products, and
the negotiation and formulation of complex interstate trade and
business agreements. With the emergence of new areas in the law,
such as environmental and fair-employment practices, and of a
powerful new weapon to expand the use of the law, namely the class
action, the corporate enterprise has become increasingly reliant
upon legal advice. 96
 The annual legal bill for all American corpora-
tions at this time is approximately $3 billion. 97 This figure repre-
sents a 75% increase of legal expenses in the past six years, and an
increase of 150% over the previous six. 98 Contrary to the Board's
statements, it is far more reasonable to argue that without such
services corporations would be unable to engage in commerce to the
degree they do so today, and that as a result, if law firms, due to a
labor dispute, were unable to provide such services, there would be
a very direct and immediate impact on interstate commerce. 99
 As
the dissenting members of the Board noted, Iwiithout the services
of the legal profession, American business as we know it today could
not function."'°°
Finally, the majority attempted to distinguish law firms from
other entities which render services to businesses engaged in inter-
state commerce, such as engineering"' and architectural firms,'"
and over which the Board has asserted jurisdiction, on the basis
that the services rendered by law firms relate directly "to the law
rather than commerce."'" The distinction drawn, especially with
regard to architectural firms, is not at all convincing. In Wurster,
Bernardi & Emmons, Inc. 1 °4 the Board asserted jurisdiction over
an architectural firm, _95% of whose work was located in the San
Francisco Bay area. 105
 The firm, however, performed work on
projects for corporations engaged in interstate commerce.'" The
Board found that "[a]rchitecture plays an irreplaceable role in the
construction industry, a major factor in commerce, and it is appar-
ent that disputes involving architects would have serious and far-





 Bodle, 84 L.R.R.M, at 1324 (dissenting opinion).
'°o Id .
1411 Gray, Rogers, Graham & Osborne, 129 N.L.R.B. 450, 47 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1960)
(engineering firm).
1 °' Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 78 L.R.R.M. 1050 (1971)
(architectural firm).
193 84 L.R.R.M. at 1322.





reaching effects upon that industry."'" This situation appears di-
rectly analogous to that of law firms, which are in effect the legal
architects of corporate decisions and policies which directly affect
interstate commerce. It appears that legal services, like architectural
services, play an "irreplaceable role" in enterprises engaged in inter-
state commerce. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Board has
asserted jurisdiction over classes of employers which have had far
less an impact on interstate commerce than have law firms. In City
Window Cleaning Co., 108
 for example, the Board asserted jurisdic-
tion over an employer who was engaged in cleaning windows for
industrial and commercial establishments within a single metropoli-
tan area.'" In Visiting Nurses Association''" the Board asserted
jurisdiction over an independent nonprofit charitable corporation
whose only function was to provide convalescent care in private
homes within the state of California)"
The second reason employed by the majority of the Board was
that there are serious policy and administrative problems which
mitigate against the exercise of jurisdiction over law firms as a class.
The first policy consideration advanced by the Board was that the
attorney-client relationship is confidential, and employees of law
firms must of necessity come into possession of knowledge and
information of a confidential nature.' 12 The Board foresaw potential
problems arising out of the nature of this relationship. For example,
the commerce data requisite for establishing jurisdiction might be
privileged information. 113
 In addition, the litigation of an unfair
labor practice allegation might result in a finding adverse to the law
firm because of its inability to produce evidence protected by
privilege. 1'4
Initially it should be noted that legal secretaries and clerical
workers are not "confidential employees" as defined by the
Board.'" Secondly, it should be noted that the attorney-client rela-
tionship, although confidential, is certainly no more confidential
than the doctor-patient relationship, and yet the Board has exercised
jurisdiction over medical clinics and hospitals. 116
 Finally, the
confidential attorney-client relationship has not previously deterred
the Board from exercising jurisdiction over attorneys. In
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 17
 the Board asserted jurisdic-
1 " Id.
1 °6
 114 N.L.R.B. 906, 37 L.R.R.M. 1062 (1955).
1 " Id. at 913, 37 L,R,R,M, at 1063.
"° 187 N.L.R.B. 731, 76 L.R.R.M, 1096 (1971).
" 1 Id.
112 Bodle, 84 L.R.R.M, at 1323.
113




 Quoin & Ramsted Clinic, 173 N.L.R.B. 1185, 69 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1968); Dr. J. C.
Campbell & Dr, Walter Boucher, Partners, 157 N.L.R.B. 1004, 61 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1966).
112 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 21 L.R,R,M. 1107 (1948).
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tion over lawyers employed by an insurance company, notwith-
standing such a relationship. 118 In Syracuse University" 9 the Board
exercised jurisdiction over a group of law school professors. If the
confidential attorney-client relationship can be accommodated when
jurisdiction is asserted over attorneys in other industries, there ap-
pears to be no reason why it cannot be accommodated in law
firms ,120
The second policy consideration utilized by the Board was that
potential conflicts of interest are likely to develop if employees of
law firms are represented by a labor union which has interests
conflicting with those of the firm's clients.' 2 ' As an example, the
Board noted that in the instant case Bodle represented various labor
unions which were in competition with the union seeking to repre-
sent Bodle's employees.' 22 Such conflicts of interest might well
deprive the firm's union clients of their right to effective representa-
tion under section 10(b) of the Act. 123 This is the most potent
argument which the majority advanced against assertion of jurisdic-
tion. However, as noted above, it is an argument which applies to a
very small percentage of law firms, and therefore loses much of its
force when applied to law firms as a class of employers.
The final consideration advanced by the Board was administra-
tive. The majority noted that any reasonable jurisdictional yardstick
generally applicable to law firms would be extremely difficult to
devise and administer. k 24 While true, this contention is unpersua-
sive. It is well settled that however difficult the drawing of lines
may be, the Act compels the task. 125 Moreover, as the dissenting
members of the Board noted, such difficulty has not deterred the
Board in the past. 126 Having analyzed the reasoning employed by
the Board, it is submitted that it cannot support the decision
reached.
In addition, there are three relevant factors which the Board
failed to consider. First, under section 14(c)(2) 127 of the Act, the
states are no longer prohibited froni assuming jurisdiction over labor
disputes over which the Board declines jurisdiction pursuant to
section 14(c)(1). In enacting section 14(c)(2), however, Congress
failed to specify whether state or federal law should be applied in
ig Id, at 1134-39, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1107-08.
119 204 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1973).
120 Bodge, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1326 (dissenting opinion).
121 Id. at 1323.
122 Id .
125
 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
124
 84 L.R.R.M. at 1323.
125 International Union of Eke., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674
(1960).
126 See, e.g., Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970) (nonprofit
universities and colleges); University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263, 66 L.R.R.M.
1263 (1967) (nursing homes).
122 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970).
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the state forum.um The states have generally applied their own
labor law.' 29 Each of the fifty states, therefore, in light of the
Board's decision in Bodle, may assume jurisdiction over law firms
and may apply their own state laws in this area. This situation has
the potential of creating an unfortunate lack of consistency in the
treatment of law firms in the different states. Given the enormous
amount of interstate dealings in which law firms are involved,
uniform treatment of law firms in this area should be encouraged.
A second policy consideration which the Board ignored is that,
not only may a disparity of treatment arise among law firms in
different states, but a disparity of treatment may arise within states
between in-house and outside counsel. Under the reasoning of
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 13° it appears that attorneys in
the direct employ of interstate enterprises should be subject to
Board jurisdiction, while under Bodle, attorneys employed by law
firms, who may advise the same enterprises, will not. Finally, the
Board in Bodle failed to make any distinction between professional
and clerical employees. If valid reasons exist for denying clerical
employees the right to unionize and bargain collectively, the Board
should have expressed them.
III. CONCLUSION
It is not submitted that all attorneys or all law firms should be
subject to Board jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that in
deciding in Bodle not to assert jurisdiction over law firms as a class,
the Board has ignored the realities of the contemporary practice of
law. The transaction of business today is very much dependent
upon legal advice. Commerce is substantially affected by large law
firms with interstate practices. The remaining arguments employed
by the Board, involving both policy and administrative considera-
tions, do not withstand the scrutiny of close analysis. Although they
may be sound arguments for declining jurisdiction over particular
law firms, they are not arguments for declining jurisdiction over law
firms generally. Even if these contentions are applicable in a given
situation, it is doubtful they are applicable to clerical employees of
law firms as well as attorneys. After considering the Bodle opinion,
the better argument appears on the side of the dissenting members
of the Board who contended that the real basis of the majority
decision was the judgment that, in some inexplicable way, the
regulation of the labor relations of law firms would hamper the
practice of law. 131
PETER E. MOLL
12° ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, The Developing Labor Law 765 (C. Morris ed.
1971).
125 Id. at 765-66,
13° 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 21 L.R.R.M, 1107 (1948).
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